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The Competitive Impacts of Leveraged Training  Outcomes1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The broad focus of this pap er is the competitive effect of government policies aimed at 
securing training outcomes from public construction contracts . Its context is the trend 
towards the contracting out of public construction works and the attempts that have been 
made to use construction contracts to ‘leverage’ a wide range of social outcomes. In 
federal and state jurisdictions it is now common for governments to impose a range of 
additional requirements on public works contractors  that relate to broad 
social/community objectives. These requirements include commitments to train 
apprentices and trainees; to provide local and/or indigenous employment opportunities; 
to buy local materials; and to include art works .  
 
The cost and benefits of using public construction contra cts to achieve social/community 
goals have, to our knowledge, not been thoroughly researched in an Australian context. 
This is likely to reflect in large part the relatively short history of contracting out p ublic 
works. As Jensen and Stonecash (2004) expl ain, most previous empirical studies of 
contracting out have attempted to measure  the cost savings achieved through 
privatization, as this was the focus of policy debate in the 1980s and 1990s . Relatively 
few studies have addressed  the ability of contracti ng arrangements to ensure the 
delivery of desired ‘quality’ outcomes 2, or the costs of achieving these outcomes via 
contracting arrangements .  
 
One of the potentia l costs of attempting to leverage social/community outcomes on 
public construction projects i s a reduction in the amount of competition  for these 
projects, with obvious consequences for average bid prices and choice. In jurisdictions, 
such as Western Australia currently, where construction market conditions are already 
causing a shortfall of tende rers and rising costs, this potential competitive effect is of 
particular concern.  
 
This paper aims to contribute knowledge on the nature and extent of the competitive  
effects of the leveraging of social/community outcomes on public construction projects. It 
does so by examining  the effects on the level of bid activity for public construction 
projects of two policies  of the Western Australian government : the Priority Access Policy 
and the Building Skills Policy.  Both of these policies aimed at ensuring an adequate 
                                                   
1 This paper forms part of the results of the Multi -outcomes Construction Policies research 
project, funded by the Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation (Project 2006 -
036-A).  A key industry partner in this research project is the Western Australian Department of 
Housing and Works, which has a  legislated responsibi lity to e nsure the efficient administ ration of 
public construction contracts i n the  State. 
 
2 A notable exception is Domberger and Jensen (1997) which ex plored the ability of a public 
authority to ensure adequate investments in vehicle maintenance in its contractual arrangements 
for the p rovision of  refuse collection services 
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supply of skilled labour in the construction industry3. The Priority Access Policy, first 
implemented in August 1999, required contractors to meet a range of minimum training 
requirements4 before being eligible to tender on public building and con struction 
contracts. The Building Skills Policy, which was first implemented in October 2002, 
specified that 10% of deemed labour hours be allocated to the employment of 
apprentices and/or trainees. On January 1 2007 both policies were integrated into the 
Priority Start – Building Po licy. 
  
The paper’s analysis of the competitive effects of these policies is based on  data drawn 
from the WA Department of Housing and Work’s (hereafter D HW) Tender Registration 
System between 1997 and 2006. The Tender Registrat ion System (TRS) was 
implemented in 1996 as a way of recording the tender details of all WA gove rnment 
construction projects. The TRS database  contains records on the details of each project:  
a description of the works to be under taken; the location of the  planned work ; and the 
estimated pre -tender value  of the project. The database  also contains information  on the 
number of tender documents requested for each project, together with  details on each of 
the tenders received  and the winning bid . As such , the TRS is a unique and 
comprehensive resource for examining changes and variations in bid activity in an 
important segment of the construction ‘market’.  
 
In this study use is made of the TRS project and tender details on 2519 government 
non-residential constru ction contracts awarded between 1997 5 and 2006. For these 
contracts 11525 tender bids were submitted. This represents close to all the contracts 
and bids included in the TRS over the ten year period. Only a  very small number of 
contracts were excluded from the analysis  due to incomplete recording of their details 6.  
 
The analysis presented in this paper is important for a number of reasons. First, it 
comprises a detailed quantitative analysis of a large set of data on pu blic construction 
contracts. To our k nowledge, little use has been made by academics of the data that 
now exists on tender b ids and outcomes in most Australian jurisdiction s. This paper 
hopefully highlights the potential to draw on these sources to gain greater insights into 
the trends and is sues affecting the construction market in Australia.   Second, it is a 
novel attempt to examine the efficiency of using the contracting arrangements of public 
works authorities  to achieve training goals . Specifically, th e analysis generates  unique 
information on the effects on competition for public construction contracts that may stem  
from different types of ‘leveraged’ training policies. The rising trend towards the 
contracting out of public sector activity, together with concerns about the availability o f 
skilled labour makes this type of information of great policy relevance . 
 
                                                   
3 Priority Access n.d.  Retrieved October 20, 2 006, from  http://policies.det.wa.edu.au/ ; Building 
Skills n.d.  Retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://policies.det.wa.edu.au/ . 
4Contractors need to meet a minimum of 100 points in order for them to be able to tender. Points 
are allocated based on the con tractor’s involvement i n specified employment  and training 
activities, such as employing apprentices and/or trainees, staff with recognised VET 
qualifications, staff with tertiary qualifications, or having staff participating in work related training 
programs.,  
5 Although the TRS was initiated in 1996, records in this year were incomplete and, thus, 
excluded from our investigation  
6 The omission of records on location and tender value appeared to be due to record keeping 
errors and is, thus, unlikely to be a source of systematic bias in the results of  our a nalysis. 
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The paper is organised in a straightforward manner. Section 2 gives  an overview of 
activity in the public non-residential construction ‘market’ in WA generated from t he TRS 
and other data sources. The third section provides an overview of  the methodology used 
to analyse the relationship between the implementation/application of the Priority Access 
and Building Skills policies and bid activity in the public construction ‘market’ . Section 4 
presents the results of this  empirical analysis , whilst the final section  provides a 
discussion and summary.  
2. Overview of the Non -Residential Construction Sector  in WA, 1997-2006 
 
The total value of non -residential construction activity completed in Western Australia in 
2006 was $2280m. As the following chart shows private sector work dominates this total, 
comprising c lose to 75% of all non -residential construction work in 2006. Public sector 
activity in 2006 was valued at $ 592m. 
 
The information in Figure 1 also shows the strong upward trend in non -residential 
construction work in the state from the beginning of 2002 , with this increase being 
dominated by private sector activity . Between December 2001 and December 2006 the 
total nominal value of private sector  work increased by 120.6%. This compared to a 
3.1% increase between December 1996 and December 2001.  
 
Figure 1: Total, Private, and Public Nominal Values for Non -Residential 
Construction Work done in Western Australia b y Quarter, December 1996 
to December 2006.  
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Source: Australia Bureau Statistics, 8752.0 Building Activity, Australia, Table 45. Value of 
Building Work by Sector, Wes tern Australia: Orig inal.  (Series Identifications: A2057722C, 
A2034996K, and A2046139R).  
 
It is not particularly surprising that the 1996 -2007 period was also characterised by a 
sharp fall in the average number of tender bids for WA government non -residential 
construction contracts. As is shown in the following  diagram, between 1997 and 2006  
the average number of bids on these contracts fell from 5.1 to 3.3  bids, or by 35.3%. A 
large part of this change was concentrated in the years from 2001.  
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Figure 2: Average Number of Tender Bids on WA Public, Non -Residential 
Construction Contracts by Year, 1997 to 2006  
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Western Australia is a large and geographically diverse state and, as such, any analysis 
of construction activity needs to take into account sizeable regional differences in costs 
of production. In the study perio d, the large majority  (70%) of public construction 
contracts related to work undertaken in the Perth region 7. A further 9% of contracts were 
located in the South West and Peel regions, both of which are relatively close to Perth.  
As is shown in Figure 3, the remaining contracts were spread across a range of remote 
regions.  
 
The decrease in bid numbers observed in the state as a whole also occurred in the two 
groups of regions identified here. In the regions located relatively close to Perth – that is, 
the Perth, Peel, and South West regional development regions – the average number of 
tender bids declined by 42% between 2001 and 2006. In the remaining, more remote 
regions, this decline was 35%.  
 
  
                                                   
7 This study matched the postcode information contained in the TRS with the WA Department of 
Land Information’s regional development regions 7 to identify the  regional distribution of contracts 
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Figure 3: WA Public Non -Residential Construction Awarded Contracts by Regional 
Development Region, 1997 to 2006 (per cent ) 
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Another source of diversity in public non -residential construction work in WA is the size 
of the work undertaken. Projects range from small additions to local school s to large 
infrastructure projects. This diversity is especially important in the context of the current 
investigation because the training policies being studied only apply to relatively large 
projects. The Priority Access Policy applies only to contracts  with a pre -tender value of 
$150,000 or more ; the Building Skills Policy to contracts with a pre -tender value of more 
than $2 million. 1019 contracts (or 54.2% of all awarded contracts) have been  subject to 
the Priority Access Policy since its introduction in August 1999. The  Building Skills Policy 
has applied to 160 contracts (or  11.8% of all awarded contracts) since its introduction in 
October 2002 . Further information on the size distribution of awarded contracts is 
contained in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Contracts by Pre -Qualification 
Financial Level, 1997 to 2006 (per cent).  
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The downward trend in tender bid numbers was common to each of the pre-qualification 
levels associated with the contracts , but it was largest in magnitude in the Level 2 -4 
(mid-range) categories. This pattern is su mmarised in the following table.  
 
Table 1: Percentage Decline in the Average Number of Tender Bids by Pre -
Qualification Financial Level be tween 2001 and 2006.  
Pre-Qualification Financial Level  Percentage Decline in the Avera ge 
Number of Tender Bids  
(Level 0) - $1 to $149,000  22.9% 
(Level 1) - $150,000 to $750,000  50.2% 
(Level 2) - $750,001 to $1,500,000  56.4% 
(Level 3) - $1,500,001 to $3 ,000,000 60.4% 
(Level 4) - $3,000,001 to $7,500,000  56.4% 
(Level 5) - $7,500,001 and above  26.2% 
 
The observed trends in bid numbers are likely to have been strongly influenced by 
changes in factors affecting the availability of other construction work  and the 
cost/availability of resources. The years since 2002 have been associated with 
substantial growth in WA’s resource and construction industries and this has produced 
large pressures on available labour and materials.  
 
A number of related statistica l measures convey information on these pressures. For 
example, as is shown in the following chart, the DHW’s Building Cost Index 8 there was 
only a s light rise in building costs  (by around 8%)  from the beginning of 1997 up to mid 
2002 but these then increased rapidly (by around 55%) to the end of 2006.  
 
                                                   
8 for the Perth region this includes both labou r and material costs . 
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Figure 5: Building Cost Index for the Perth Region by Month, January 1997 to 
December 2006.  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Ja
n-
97
Ju
l-9
7
Ja
n-
98
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Month
In
de
x
 
Source: The Western Australian Department of Housing and Works.  Works and Building 
Construction Building Cost Inde x – Perth, File BB 576/87, Personal communication DHW, 
May 30 2007  
 
The building cost index is derived from measure s of labour and materials costs and 
reflects the costs of accomplishing standard types of public and private sector  
construction projects 9. The influence of labour costs on the index is apparent in the 
similar pattern of change in construction industry wages over the study period. These 
remained relative ly stable between February  1996 and August 2002  (increasing by onl y 
1.6%). However, they rose rapidly from August 2002  onwards, increasing by 40.8% by 
November 2006  (ABS, 2006a) . Materials costs rose by only 6.1% b etween December 
1996 and September 2002  but rose by 23.6% between the September 2002 and 
December 2006  (ABS 2006b).  
 
Labour shortages emerged in the state post 2002 and were an important contributor to 
the rising wage costs. Illustrating this, t he Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations skills vacancy index  (DEWR n.d.) , which  provides a monthly indicator of the 
degree of difficulty that employers have in filling vacancies in occupations or specialised 
skill needs , recorded a 129.5%  increase between the start  of 2002 and the end of 2006 . 
 
3. Multi-Factor Analysis of Bid Activity  
 
The central  research question addressed in this paper is whether the additional training 
requirements imposed as a result of the Priority Access and Building Skills policies had a 
measurable and distinct  impact on bid act ivity for public construction contra cts. That is, 
was there  a measurable  effect of these policies on bid numbers that was separate from 
the impacts on bid activity generated by changing e conomic conditions in the state?  
 
Conducting such an analysis clearly requires a multi-factor approach that is able to  
‘control’ for the influence of the range of other  factors on bid numbers (such as changes 
                                                   
9 For example, it reports the current cost of a typical school and prison.  
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in private construction activity  and costs, as well as variations in contract region and 
project size) before focusing on the relationship between the implementation of the 
policies and bid activity.  
 
The approach adopted for this investigation is to examine variations in the number of 
tender bids for non-residential government construction contracts around the time of the 
implementation of each policy 10. In the case of P riority Access policy, the analysis period 
is August 1997 to August 2001, which encompasses the 24 months prior to and the 24 
months after the implementation date of the policy. In the case of the Building Skills 
policy, the 48 month analysis period is October 2 000 to October 2004.  
 
The analysis focuses on differences in bid activity between the ‘market’ segments 
affected and unaffected by the policy. In the case of the Priority Access Policy this 
involves a comparison of changes in bid activity across the analys is period between a) 
projects with a pre -tender value of at least $150,000 (and thus potentially affected by the 
policy); and b) projects with a pre-tender value of less than $150,000 (not affected by the 
policy). In the case of the Building Skills Policy the two comparison groups are a) 
projects with a pre -tender value of more than $2million; and b) projects with a pre -tender 
value of $2  million or less. In each case we hypothesise that if the policies were affecting 
bid activity, activity levels would fal l in relative terms in the market segment affected by 
the policy. Furthermore, this fall would be observed in the analysis period.  
 
The following chart  shows bid activity in the two market segments associated with the 
Priority Access policy over the analys is period. This data is clearly not supportive of the 
above hypothesis. In fact an opposite pattern is apparent: the average number of bids 
declined for contracts not subject to the Priority Access policy over the analysis period, 
whilst there was negligib le change in the average number of bids for tenders subject to 
the policy.  
 
                                                   
10 This approach to restricting the time period allows us to focus more fully on the effects of the 
policy whilst allowing for the possibility of anticipatory or delayed effects  
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Figure 6: Average Number of Tender Bids for Contracts with a Pre -tender value < 
$150,000 and Tenders with a Pre -tender value • $150,000 by Year, 1997 to 
2001 
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The following chart provides information on changes in the average number of bids for 
contracts affected/not affected by the Building Skills policy  between 2000 and 200 4. At 
face value this data is more supportive of a h ypothesis that the policy affected bid 
activity: the average number of bids for contracts subject to the policy fell at a greater 
rate than those not subject to the policy over the analysis period. There is also an 
apparent alignment between the introducti on of the policy and this relative change. 
However, given the strength of the other influences on the construction market (as 
described in the previous section), there is a need for caution before reaching  firm 
conclusions about the effects of  the policy. The following section provides more definitive 
insights. 
 
Figure 7: Average Number of Tender Bids for Tenders with a Pre -tender value • 
$2m and Tenders with a Pre -tender value > $2m by Year, 2000 to 200 6. 
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3.1 Econometric Strategy 
 
The multi-factor analysis of the relationship between bid activity and policy settings is 
structured into two parts, each relating to the key policy initiatives: Priority Access and 
Building Skills. In each part, however, the same approach is taken to the measurement 
of the effects of the policy.  Specifically, l inear (OLS) regression techniques are used to 
estimate the following equation , which relates to the determination of the number of bids 
for public construction contracts.  
 
           NB i = • 1 + •2 PDi + •3 Zi + •4 PTi + • 5RNi + • 6OFi + •2 (Zi x PDi) + • i           (1) 
 
NB i, is the number of bids submitted on contract i; PD i is a dummy variable that is based 
on the date of implementation of the policy (for example, in the case of Priority Access 
this variable takes on a value of 1 for all contracts dated after August 1999); Z i is a 
dummy variable that identifies whether the contract falls within the scope of the policy’s 
application (in the case of Priority Access this variable is coded as ‘1’ for all contracts 
with a value of $150,000 or more); PT i is a cont inuous measure that relates to the 
contract’s pre -tender value; RN i is a dummy variable that identifies whether the location 
of the project was in the Perth, South -West or Peel Regions, or in another, more remote 
region. OF i is a continuous variable based on the value of the Building Cost index in the 
month that the bids were recorded. It is used in this model to proxy the level of 
competition in the construction market 11. Finally, the int eraction term (Z i*PDi) identifies 
those projects that were affected by the implementation of the policy (for example, in the 
case of Priority Access this variable will only take on a value of 1 for contracts with a pre -
tender value of $150,000 or more and dated after August 1999). • i is a random error 
term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with E(• i)=0 and the var (• i)= •2. 
 
The modelled relationship can be described in the following simplified terms. First, the 
function S, shown in the diagram b elow, represents the positive relationship between the 
pre-tender value of the contract and the number of bids.  
 
                                                   
11 As noted in the p revious section, this index reflects current costs of accomplishin g the types of 
construction projects contracted for via the TRS. A variety of measures of market conditions 
(such as indexes of labour availability, mat erials costs, etc) are available. However, testing 
indicated that these are strongly correlated with the Building Cost Index.  
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The other factors in the model are hypothesised to be associated with shifts in this 
function. For example, in  more remote regions the function S could be expected to shift 
downwards (implying a positive coefficient on the variable RN i in equation 1) due to the 
greater difficulties in accomplishing construction work in these areas  as compared to 
less remote regions. The background statistics shown in earlier parts of this paper 
support this  hypothesis. Higher building costs are likely to be associated with a 
downward/rightward shift in the function (implying a negative value on the coefficient on 
OFi). If the intro duction of a training policy has a negative effect on bid activity, its 
application only to projects with a PT i • Zi would cause a discontinuity in S around point 
Zi (as rep resented by the function S’). Evidence in support of this hypothesis would be a 
significant negative coefficient on the interactive term (Z i*PDi). The individual term PD i 
controls for the possibi lity (seemingly remote) that there was a change in bid activity for 
all contracts around the time of the introduction of the policy. The individual term Z i 
controls for the possibility (more likely) that there are underlying differences in the 
relationship  between tender activity and pre -tender prices in the group of contracts 
‘priced’ above and below the trigger value of the policy . 
4. Results 
 
The estimated relationships between tender bid numbers and the various explanatory 
variables included in the RHS of equation 1 using DHW data are outlined in this section. 
Reflecting the above discussion, these results are presented separately for the Priority 
Access and Building Skills policies.  
  
Priority Access Policy  
Equation 1 was first estimated with reference to data on bid numbers on DHW contracts 
for the period August 1997 to August 2001. In this case Zi is defined by the int roduction 
NBi 
PT i 
S 
S’ 
Z 
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of the Priority Access Policy in August 1999 and PD i is defined by the policy’s application 
to projects with a value of $150,0 00 or more.  
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non -
Residential Construction Contracts ( Priority Access Policy ), Western 
Australia 1997-2001. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant -4.2950 0.6142 
Policy Implementation Date  (PD) -0.4990 0.3528 
Contract above trigger value (Z) 0.9299 0.0007 
Pre-Tender Value (PT)  -1.29E-07 0.0033 
Region 1.4243 0.0000 
Building Cost Index  0.0720 0.3394 
PD*Z 0.0216 0.9612 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: 1957.8; Nobs: 789; Method: OLS  
 
The data in Table 2 indicate that the implementation of the Priority Access Policy in 
August 1999 did not have a significant effect on competition for government non -
residential construction contracts in WA. The reduction in bid numbers observed around 
the time of the implementation of this policy was similar in ‘market segments’ subject to 
the influence of the policy (i.e. contracts with a value of $150,000 or more ) and in other 
parts of the ‘market’. The figures in Table 2 show, rather, that during the analysis period 
(August 1997 to August 2001) bid numbers varied between contracts first ly due to 
regional factors. The average number of bids on contracts in more remote regions was 
1.42 bids less than the number of bids on contracts in the Perth, South West and  Peel 
group of regions. Bid numbers in the analysis period were a lso significantly affected by 
the value of the contract. Contracts with a value of $150,000 or more had, on ave rage, 
close to 1 additional bid per contract  than those  with a lower pre -tender value.  A 
somewhat surprising result is the lack of a statistical significant relationship between the 
building cost index and bid numbers. The most likely explanation for this is that, as was 
outlined in previous sections, the period 1997 to 2001 was a period of relatively stable 
economic conditions. There was little variation in the building cost index over the 
analysis period and, thus, this was not an important  source of diff erences in bid activity.  
 
Building Skills Policy  
 
The results derived from the application of Equation 1 to TRS data relevant to the 
Building Skills Policy are presented in Table 3. In this case the analysis period spans 
October 2000 to October 2004; Zi is defined by the introduction of the Building Skills  
Policy in October 2002; and PDi is defined by the policy’s application to projects with a 
value above $2 million . 
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non -
Residential Construction Contracts ( Building Skills  Policy), Western 
Australia 2000-2004. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant 9.3524 0.0000 
Policy Implementation Date (PD)  -0.4719 0.0516 
Contract above trigger value (Z)  1.4512 0.1009 
Pre-Tender Value (PT)  1.39E-07 0.0008 
Region 1.2794 0.0000 
Building Cost Index  -0.0436 0.0004 
PD*Z -1.4152 0.0986 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: 1 873.5; Nobs: 807; Method: OLS 
 
The data in Table 3 provide some evidence of  a negative impact of the Building Skills 
Policy on bid activity relating to  government non -residential construction contracts in 
WA. Bid numbers on contracts affected by the policy (i.e. above $2  million in value and 
commencing after O ctober 2002) were, on average, 1.42 bids lower than contracts not 
affected by the policy after 2002. However, this effect was only statistically significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
A further contrast between the results in Table 3 and those in Table 2 is the si gnificance 
of building costs as a source of variation in bid numbers. The figures in Table 3 indicate 
a strong negative relationship between the building cost index and bid numbers . The 
difference between the results  in Table 2 and 3  is likely to derive from the relatively large 
rate of change in the building cost index between 2000 and 2004 , as compared to 1997 -
2001.  
 
A similarity between the two sets of results is the measured importance of regional 
factors as a source of variation  in bid numbers. In Tab le 3 the average number of bids 
on contracts in more remote regions was 1. 27 bids  less than the number of bids on 
contracts in the Perth, South West and Peel region. Finally, bid numbers in the analysis 
period relevant to the Building Skills Policy  were positively affected by the value of the 
contract. 
5. Discussion & Conclusion 
This paper has identified that the Building Skills Policy, but not the Priority Access 
Policy, affected bid activity for non -residential construction contracts in WA. Bid numbers 
were lower on contracts affected by the Building Skills Policy following the 
implementation of the policy in October 2002. This effect was distinct from the influence 
of changes in c onstruction costs and regional and project size factors on bid numbers.  
 
These results are significant for two key reasons. First, they indicate that the Building 
Skills Policy contributed to a lowering of competition for public construction contracts in 
the 48 month period surrounding its implementation. Such an impact has efficienc y 
consequences for the public construction program, potentially contributing to higher 
costs and/or lower quality outcomes. Given that WA is currently under the influence of a 
range of economic pressures, these added costs are of particular concern.  
 
However, this conclusion does not necessarily imply that the Priority Access Policy was 
a superior training policy. It is important to ask why the Priority Access Policy  did not  
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affect the willingness of construction companies to bid for public projects. One possible 
answer is that it did not impose  high training requirements – or affect  the training actions 
of construction firms in a significant manner.  If this is the case, the evidence presented 
in this paper can not be interpreted as supportive of the policy .  
 
In sum, the results in this paper indicate that the Building Skills Policy affected the 
actions of construction companies, causing some to avoid tendering for public 
construction contracts. This result also suggests, however, that the policy was effect ive 
in influencing the inclusion/exclusion of public contractors according to their  training 
commitments . There is little evidence that the Priority Access Policy affected bid activity 
in the public construction ‘market’. Although this may be interpreted i n the positive light – 
that is, of the policy not having negative competitive effects - it is also possible that the 
policy did not affect  training outcomes on public works.  
 
The two policies had similar objectives: to promote training and, thus, the avail ability of 
skills in the construction industry in WA. The fact that this paper has identified 
differences in the behavioural effects of the two policies raises additional research 
questions about their  design. For example, were there  features of the design  and 
implementation of the Priority Access Policy that caused it to have very little impact? 
What can policy makers interested in promoting training learn from a comparison of the 
two policies that will inform future policy development? Future papers will address these 
important questions.  
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